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COMMENTARY ON LAW: 
WALLOWING IN INTENTION 
Gene R. Nichol* 
Professor Law, as is her practice, 1 has offered a powerful and 
provocative comment on American constitutional jurisprudence. Her 
arguments are straightforward. After examining the constitutional 
founders' ideas about families and women, she concludes that judges 
cannot look to "the intent of the . . . framers to resolve constitutional 
claims premised on conflicting visions of the family."2 By implication, 
however, her position is somewhat broader. Attempting to deflect 
some aspects of the "original intent" critique of modern constitutional 
decisionmaking,3 Professor Law claims that a variety of controversial 
privacy and equality decisions are not unfounded merely because they 
*Cutler Professor of Constitutional Law and Director, Institute of Bill of Rights Law, College 
of William and 1\lary, Marshall-Wythe School of Law. 
1. For other works by Professor Law, see, especially, her exploration of the privacy/sexual 
autonomy decisions through a gender discrimination lens. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitu-
tion, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 955 (1984); see ge'lle'rally, e.g., Law, Economic Jnstice, in OuR 
ENDANGERED RIGHTS 134-59 (Dorsen ed. 1984). 
2. Law, Tlze Founders Fat/ze,-s on Families, 39 U. FLA L. REv. 583, 585 (1987). 
3. Primarily, of course, the "originalist" claim has been emphasized recently by Att'y Gen. 
1\leese. See, e.g., E. 1\leese, Speech Before the American Bar Association (July 9, 1985) [hereinaf-
ter Speech Before American Bar], 'tep-tinted in FEDERALIST SOCIETY, THE GREAT DEBATE: 
INTERPRETING OUR WRITTEN CONSTITUTION 9 (Occasional Paper No. 2, 1986) [hereinafter 
THE GREAT DEBATE) (calling for a "Jurisprudence of Original Intention"); E. Meese, Speech 
Before the Federalist Society Lawyers Division (Nov. 15, 1985) [hereinafter Speech Before 
Federalist Society], rep-tinted in THE GREAT DEBATE, sup-ra, at 36 (describing "Jurisprudence 
of Original Intention"); see generally R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANS-
FORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 363-72 (1977); Bork, Neutral Principles and 
Some Fi'fst Amendment Pmblems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971). 
Early in her article, Professor Law cites to contemporary scholars who use the terms 
"interpretivism" and "original intention" interchangeably - as does the Attorney General. See 
Law, supm note 2, at 584 n.lO. But attempting to tie judicial descisionmaking to the language 
of the constitutional text is different from limiting the interpretation of the text to the specific 
intentions of the framers. Though claiming to approach "constitutional interpretation" beginning 
"\vith the document itself," see, e.g., Speech Before Federalist Society, supra, at 33, the Attorney 
General apparently has little interest in "strictly interpreting'' the first amendment to comply 
with the "no law" textual command. See e.g., ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMJIIISSION ON PORNOG-
RAPHY, FINAL REPORT (1986). For the originalist, the intentions of the framers often take on 
greater significance than the words of the constitutional charter. Equal protection, for example, 
is read to mean freedom from racial discrimination. I \vill use the terms "originalist'' and 
"intentionalist'' to refer to advocates of the original intent doctrine. 
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move beyond the contemplation of the framers. 4 Constitutional rulings 
protecting abortion rights, 5 interests in sexual preference, 6 and sexual 
equality,7 for example, are not wrong simply because the architects 
of our charter might not have agreed with them. 
Intention fails as a decisionmaking guide, in her view, for two 
reasons. First, the "people who crafted" the Constitution "held conflict-
ing ideas and values about families and the role of women in society.""' 
Accordingly, some difficulty is presented in locating the correct inten-
tion to instruct modern adjudication. Second, and more fundamentally, 
the "founders' dominant conceptions of families denied the liberty, 
equality, and even personhood of women."9 Since this view is at odds 
with an existing ''broad consensus across a moral and political spec-
trum"10 supporting the recognition of the full personhood of women, 
our present task is to "envision constitutional and cultural arrange-
ments that read the words 'We the People' quite literally, even though 
that was not originally intended. "11 Issues of sexual equality and au-
tonomy are our issues, not the founders'. In these matters at least, 
we should let the framers rest. 
Of course, taking on the challenge of commenting, or worse, re-
sponding to Professor Law's essay is no enviable task. The essay's 
full texture and compelling conclusions call more for reflection than 
refutation. The logical avenues of attack are either to attempt to rebut 
the historical claims presented, or to deny the validity of the ramifi-
cations for modern constitutional analysis that Professor Law draws 
from her review of the framers' world. In general, this commentary 
will pursue neither course. I am not competent to do the former,I2 
and disinclined to try the latter. 13 
4. For the decisions Professor Law seeks to rescue from condemnation specifically, see 
Law, supra note 2, at. 
5. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
6. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986) (refusing to extend privacy rights to 
the protection of homosexual conduct). 
7. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1970) (statute that preferred male estate adminis-
trators over equally qualified females declared unconstitutional). 
8. See Law, supra note 2, at 585. 
9. ld. 
10. Id. 
11. ld. 
12. I will note a small historical inaccuracy, but one which only serves to bolster Professor 
Law's description of the framers' disregard for the personhood of women. In making the accurate 
claim that "[s]ilence, absolute and deafening, is the central theme of the [Founding Fathers'] 
discussions of women and families," Professor Law refers to the absence of references to women 
and families in the constitutional debates, the Federalist papers, etc. See Law, supra note 2, 
at 586 n13. A reference to women in Madison's Notes, and I think (or at least Walter Dellinger 
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My goal, instead, is a more limited one. First, I will disagree 
briefly with the interpretive significance Professor Law draws from 
the framers' conflicting views about the rights of women. Second, and 
more important, I will explore a particular contribution to the debate 
over the use of original intent in constitutional interpretation that the 
Law essay provides. 
Professor Law's rejection of the use of original intent to instruct 
contemporary decisionmaking in privacy/equality cases is based in part 
on the assertion that the framers entertained "conflicting ideas . . . 
about families and the role of women in society."14 After describing 
what she characterizes as the dominant view of families in the 
eighteenth century, one lodged completely in patriarchy and male 
supremacy, Professor Law offers a second story. This contrasting 
picture, also a segment of our constitutional legacy, reveals greater 
gender equality and sexual freedom. 15 The process is repeated for the 
drafters of the fourteenth amendment. Dominant nineteenth century 
assumptions denied women the ability to take part in most economic 
and political activity, and did so in a more purposeful manner than 
ever before. 16 The competing, hopeful story emphasizes that the post 
Civil War era was a time when women took part in public activities 
in great numbers, and when society highly regarded the role of women 
as mothers and homemakers. 17 Professor Law suggests the tensions 
between these competing vistas renders the use of the founders' 
intentions problematic. To my mind, however, the interpretive lesson 
that Professor Law seeks to glean from these contrasting visions is 
exaggerated. 
Law's optimistic eighteenth century story stems from two distinct 
features of colonial life: the momentum of the Enlightenment's desire 
informs me that it is so) the only reference to women contained in the debates, which Professor 
Law missed, is a rejected version of the fugitive slave clause: "If any person bound to service 
or labor in any of the United States, shall escape into another State, he or she shall not be 
discharged from such service or labor ... but shall be delivered up to the person justly claiming 
their service or labor." J. l\1ADISON, JOURNAL OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 631 (E. Scott 
ed. 1970) (emphasis added). There is, of course, no small irony in the fact that only on this 
issue would the need to mention women arise. 
13. There are, of course, those who would make such a claim with no small persuasive 
appeal. See, e.g., Monaghan, Our Pe-rfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353 (1981). 
14. See Law, sup-l"a note 2, at 585. 
15. ld. at 594. 
16. Id. at 608. 
17. ld. 
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to end passivity and dependence in politics and religion, 18 and women's 
increased political and social participation generated by the exigencies 
of the Revolutionary War. 19 Professor Law concedes, however, that 
the framers' culture interfered with their perceptions, and prevented 
them from seeing that the revolution's "anti-patriarchal" ideals would 
directly affect women and familes. 20 Her argument rooted in the poten-
tial of Enlightenment thought therefore actually collapses into a quite 
distinct line of attack, which I will address in the second half of this 
commentary - that the framers' concept of the role of women is so 
much at odds with our later constitutional development that it should 
simply be rejected. 21 
I assume it is true, on the other hand, that women experienced 
subtle stirrings of augmented power during the Revolutionary period. 
But managing farms and businesses, participating in political boycotts, 
soliciting funds for the war effort, expanding (though still minimal) 
property rights, and even some increasing flexibility in marital de-
cisionmaking22 do not rise to the level of debilitating framer discord 
on the theories of liberty that modern privacy and equality decisions 
implicate. Moreover, Professor Law's characterization of the patriarc-
hal image of family as the "dominant" strand of eighteenth century 
thought effectively concedes that the specific legislative purposes of 
the Bill of Rights did not include the protection of either non-traditional 
family practices or sexual equality. 
The competing visions offered of the world of 1868 similarly pose 
little actual interpretive difficulty. Law's optimistic view of nineteenth 
century thought stresses the writings of John Stuart Mill, women's 
heavy participation in the abolitionist movement, the Seneca Falls 
Convention, and the granting of the franchise to women in two states. 
But, as she also explains, the rebuff to women's equality reflected in 
the Civil War Amendments was, if anything, more dramatic than the 
omission of constitutional protections in 1791. Section two of the four-
teenth amendment put the word "male" in the Constitution for the 
first time. Prominent feminists accordingly campaigned against its 
18. ld. at 594 (citing F. WEINSTEIN & G. PLATT, THE WISH TO BE FREE: SOCIETY, 
PSYCHE AND VALUE CHANGE 49 (1969)). 
19. Law, supra note 2, at 595-97. 
20. ld. at 594. 
21. See infra notes 26-60 and accompanying text. 
22. See Law, supra note 2, at 597-99. 
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enactment. Furthermore, Congress rejected efforts to include the 
word "sex" in the fifteenth amendment's guarantee of the right to 
vote.23 
I do not mean to imply that no one believed in sexual equality or 
autonomy in either 1791 or 1868. Any fair reading of the history of 
those periods, however, including Professor Law's, would necessarily 
conclude that se:A"Ual independence and gender parity, as we know 
those terms, were then beyond our general societal ken. This may 
seem obvious and insignificant. But recall that Professor Law's thesis 
is presented as rebuttal to a claim. She begins with the acknowledg-
ment that "many influential lawyers, scholars, judges, and public offi-
cials urge us to look to the original intent of the men who drafted 
and ratified the Constitution to determine its contemporary mean-
ing."21 She counters, in part, that such a venture is impossible in 
actions based on disputed family and sexual roles because the framers' 
visions themselves were in conflict. She points, however, to no widely 
held theories of liberty, in either 1791 or 1868, that would embrace, 
for example, the right to procure an abortion, to engage in heterosex-
ual or homosexual sodomy, to obtain contraceptives for minors, or to 
protect illegitimates from discrimination. These are the types of cases 
that Professor Law seeks to rescue from attack at the hands of a 
"Jurisprudence of Original Intent." But here the conflict argument 
disappears. 
As Professor Law claims, we probably should refuse to tie constitu-
tional interpretation to the specific notions of liberty and equality its 
draftsmen entertained. But that is not because, in the circumstances 
giving rise to the controversial decisions Professor Law seeks to de-
fend, the framers' designs are contradictory. The demands of theRe-
volutionary War, like those of later wars, gave women a more promi-
nent role in public life. But they merely became more visible, not 
more equal. The laws of coverture and dependence Professor Law 
identifies were crafted to prevent the full development of women. By 
the time of the Civil War Amendments, the women's movement had 
begun to wage its long battle for progress. But the struggle lasted 
decades, and for the better part of a century was unsuccessful. The 
"separate spheres" notion that Professor Law describes was con-
sciously constructed to thwart the nascent move toward female eman-
cipation. At some level, the framers may have disagreed on the role 
23. ld. at 606. 
24. Id. at 584. 
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women should play in society. They showed precious little confusion, 
however, about the unequal status of women under the law.25 
As explained below, it is a strange effort to explore the minds of 
the framers to find constitutional answers to problems concerning, for 
example, contraception, teenage pregnancy, the eased access to abor-
tion resulting from technological change, and the spiritual and ethical 
conundrum created by modern developments such as surrogate 
motherhood and test tube babies. Despite Law's arguments, however, 
those who do advocate interpretation via original intent can confidently 
assert that the framers of the fifth, ninth, and fourteenth amendments 
had no acknowledged desire to assure non-traditional sexual autonomy 
or gender equality. Professor Law's essay offers no serious rejoinder 
to that claim. Substantial indication of this view lies in the fact that 
the optimistic views proffered are not in any way linked to the men 
who drafted and ratified the Constitution. Professor Law, instead, 
focuses on pockets of colonial or Reconstruction thought that provide 
more hopeful portraits of the full humanity of women and children. 
For the rigid inti:mtionalist, these pockets represent, at most, loser's 
history, even if the losses were short term in nature. They do not, 
as Professor Law suggests, render it impossible to conclude that the 
framers' conceptions of liberty and equality did not embrace what in 
the latter decades of the twentieth century we consider the rights of 
women. 
But this criticism goes only to a minor plank in the Law platform. 
"The Founders on Families" demonstrates the far more significant 
claim that the framers' conceptions of women and family were so 
dramatically different from our own that they cannot be made the 
basis for modern constitutional decisionmaking. In the process, Profes-
sor Law's essay offers a noteworthy contribution to the debate on 
decisionmaking by original intent. In a relatively brief essay, she im-
merses the reader in a world rarely explored in constitutional jurispru-
dence -that of the American woman of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
25. Of course, using the concrete intentions of the Constitution's framers to determine the 
outer boundaries of contemporary adjudication begs the question of the level of generality to 
be given to broad guarantees to liberty and equality. It is, on that score, a controversial 
undertaking. See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text for a discussion. Given an elevated 
level of generality, a conflict between the aspirations of the Enlightenment and the specific 
conceptions of sexual equality held by the framers could be engendered. That, however, is not 
the sort of clash that Professor Law describes. See generally Tushnet, Following the Rules 
Laid Down: A Critique of lnterpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 791 
(1983). 
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centuries. In the course of the inquiry, we learn a great deal about 
the heavy use of original intent in constitutional decisionmaking. It is 
to that lesson that I now turn. 
At first glance, the original intent critique of modern constitutional 
jurisprudence is e:l\"tremely attractive. 26 The present constitutional 
landscape is littered with decisions such as those demanding the busing 
of school children, prohibiting prayer in the schools, and limiting the 
state's ability to proscribe abortions, which have on occasion been the 
subject of massive public disapproval. It is broadly understood that 
constitutional interpretation involves more than reading opinion polls. 
But the relationship between such controversial rulings and the text 
of our fundamental charter has sometimes appeared tenuous. And if 
Supreme Court decisionmaking represents mere policy choice, can it 
truly be said to be constitutional interpretation at all? Posing an argu-
ment from democracy, therefore, the originalist concludes that "[t]he 
will and judgment of persons accountable to the electorate should be 
limited not by the countervailing will and judgment of the judiciary, 
but only by the will and judgment of the Framers. "27 Not only is this 
vision of judicial power demanded by our commitment to majority 
rule, but it reflects the popular "civics book"28 understanding of the 
distribution of governmental authority in the American political sys-
tem. Judges apply the law; they don't make it. And when judges move 
beyond the intended meaning of a legal provision, they exceed their 
authority. 
This appealing claim has been attacked from a number of directions. 
As several commentators have noted, it is far from clear who the 
relevant framers are. 29 Participants in the state legislatures or ratify-
ing conventions, rather than the actual draftsmen, are the most logical 
candidates. But pinpointing the specific intentions of so large and 
diverse a group is problematic and records of state deliberations, espe-
cially regarding the Civil War Amendments, are scanty. 
26. By "originalist" I refer to what Professor Brest has described as an advocate of "strict 
intentionalism." See Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. 
REv. 204, 204 (1980). For the strict intentionalist, "[t]he whole aim of construction, as applied 
to a provision of the Constitution, is ... to ascertain and give effect to the intent of its Framers 
and the people who adopted it." See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 453 
(1934). 
27. See Perry, lnterpretivism, Freedom of Expression and Equal Protection, 42 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 261, 276 (1981). 
28. ld. at 276. 
29. See, e.g., J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 11-41 (1980). 
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Others have questioned the originalists' use of history. Strict inten-
tionalism, as an interpretive device, assumes that constitutional de-
cisionmaking can be grounded in a sufficiently clear understanding of 
the framers' designs to eliminate judicial subjectivity. The Attorney 
General, for example, has argued that "we lmow how the Founding 
Fathers lived, and much of what they read, thought, and believed 
.... We lmow who did what, when, and many times why."30 History 
does provide reasonably clear portraits of the framers' intentions con-
cerning some issues.31 But on many ofthe most intractable and controv-
ersial aspects of constitutional jurisprudence, such as the incorporation 
doctrine, freedom of the press, and separation of church and state, 
the purposes of the framers are far from clear. Mark Tushnet has 
suggested that the only way to bridge the gap between the founders 
and ourselves is to "creatively construct" history.32 "Particularly in 
aspects that the interpretivists care about, [the past] is in essence 
indeterminate .... "33 Uncertainty, however, seriously undermines 
the rationale for originalism. 
Professor Powell, on the other hand, has argued that the 1787 
framers almost certainly did not view the Constitution as the embod-
iment of their specific intentions. 34 Late eighteenth century common 
lawyers regarded a provision's intent not as what the drafters meant, 
but rather as what judges, employing legal reason and judgment, 
understood the words to mean. 35 Moreover, Madison himself claimed 
30. Speech Before Federalist Society, supra note 3, at 33. 
31. To my mind, indeterminancy alone does not defeat all uses of originalist jurisprudence. 
It does seem plausible to conclude, for example, given the fifteenth amendment, that the framers 
of the fourteenth amendment did not believe its provisions guaranteed voting rights. See, e.g., 
Justice Harlan's opinion in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 667-68 (1966) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting). I also think, as I have argued here, that there is little doubt that the framers of 
the Bill of Rights had no specific desire to assure gender equality. Still, intentionalist jurispru-
dence becomes massively indeterminate on many of the central issues of American constitutional 
jurisprudence. The dispute over the incorporation doctrine is perhaps the best, and most impor-
tant, example. Moreover, as I claim below, the originalist position has more flaws than mere 
indeterminancy. 
32. See Tushnet, supra note 25, at 800. 
33. See id; see also Brest, supra note 26, at 222 ("[In most instances] the interpreter's 
understanding of the original understanding [is] so indeterminate as to undermine the rationale 
for originalism."); Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y. U. L. REv. 469, 477 (1981) ("There 
is no such thing as the intention of the Framers waiting to be discovered . . . . There is only 
some such thing waiting to be invented."). 
34. See generally Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. 
REV. 885 (1985). 
35. ld. at 896. 
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that his knowledge of the views actually held by delegates to the 
Philadelphia and Virginia conventions was a source of ''bias" in his 
constitutional interpretations: "As a guide in expounding and applying 
the provisions of the Constitution, the debates and incidental decisions 
of the Convention can have no authoritative character."36 The 
miginalist is thus required to reject the framers' specific belief that 
their intentions would not be dispositive in constitutional interpreta-
tion. On historical grounds, these twin shortcomings of indeterminancy 
and internal inconsistency leave the originalist path a difficult one to 
navigate. 37 
Others have leveled broader charges. Tom Grey has shown that a 
stlingent and consistent application of the intentionalist theory, which 
would cast into doubt, for example, the incorporation doctrine, sub-
stantive and much procedural due process protection, all equality juris-
prudence as against the federal government and most against the 
states, would require "an extraordinarily radical purge of established 
constitutional doctrine. "38 Professor Dworkin has persuasively argued 
that tying the interpretation of various phrases to the specific, concrete 
intentions of the founders fundamentally mischaracterizes the nature 
of some components of the Constitution.39 A framers' intention, Dwor-
kin claims, can be characterized "abstractly, as intending the enact-
ment of the 'concept' of justice or equality [for example], or concretely, 
as intending the enactment of his particular 'conception' of those con-
:36. Id. at 936 (quoting Letter from James Madison to Thomas Ritchie (Sept. 15, 1821), 
rep;-inted in 3 LE'ITERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAlllES MADISON 228, 228 (Philadelphia 
1865)). Consider also :Madison's claim that "difficulties and differences of opinion might occasion-
ally arise in expounding terms and phrases used in such a charter ... and that it might require 
a regular course of practice to liquidate and settle the meaning of some of them." 
:37. See Chemerinsky, The Price of Asking the Wrong Question: An Essay on Constitutional 
Scholarship and Judicial Review, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1207, 1240-43 (1984); Simon, The Autharity 
of the Framers of the Constitutian: Can Originalist Interpretation Be Justified?, 73 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1482 (1985). 
38. See Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constituti()ll?, 27 STAN. L. REv. 703, 713 (1975); 
see also Nichol, Giving Substance Its Due (Book Review), 93 YALE L.J. 171, 185-87 (1983) 
(quoting Grey, sup-ra, at 713). This is one example of radical politics that the Attorney General 
apparently endorses. See Speech Before the American Bar, sup-ra note 3, at 7-9 (arguing for 
the rejection of the incorporation doctrine). 
39. Dworkin refers specificially to "what are often called 'vague' standards, for example, 
the provision that the government shall not deny men due process of Jaw, or equal protection 
of the Jaws." R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 133 (1977). 
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cepts."40 Originalists demand that the religion clauses, the due process 
and equal protection clauses, and the speech and press clauses be 
given no more expansive interpretations than the particularized con-
ceptions of the framers can support. But if those who drafted the 
broad clauses of the Constitution had intended to set out "particular 
conceptions," Dworkin argues, "they would have found the sort of 
language conventionally used" to accomplish that task. 41 One is re-
minded, of course, of Edmund Randolph's claim that the Constitutional 
Convention's Committee on Detail, in drafting the text, sought "[t]o 
insert essential principles only, lest the operations of government 
should be clogged by rendering those provisions permanent and unal-
terable, which ought to be accommodated to times and events. "42 
As a whole then, the arguments leveled against a "Jurisprudence 
of Original Intent"43 are substantial. Professor Law's essay, however, 
approaches intention from a different, and compelling, direction. In-
stead of exploring the vagaries of historiography or the nature of the 
Constitution as law, "The Founders on Families" delves into the world 
eighteenth and nineteenth century women experienced. Its tenor and 
effect have little in common with the typical theoretical discussions of 
what the framers meant or did not mean, and what the judicial ramifi-
cations of the inclusions or exclusions might be. As a result, we must 
consider the Founders' intentions on a different plane, imagining their 
relationships and their hierarchies and comparing them to our own. 
This view into the sexual arrangements of our ancestors' world, how-
40. See Dworkin, supra note 33, at 490. But see Monaghan, supra note 13, at :379-80; 
Munzer & Nickel, Does the Constitution Mean What It Always Meant?, 77 COLU!Il. L. REv. 
1029, 10:37-41 (1977); Perry, supra note 27, at 297-98; Tushnet, supra note 25, at 791 (each 
challenging aspects of the Dworkin dichotomy). Dworkin has most frequently been criticized for 
failing to carry the burden of demonstrating that the framers meant to constitutionalize concepts 
rather than conceptions. See id. (framers' vision of law more positive and naturalistic than that 
which Dworkin describes). These criticisms may well be correct, though it seems to me that 
Professor Powell's work on original intention bolsters the Dworkin claim. I think, at a minimum, 
Dworkin demonstrates that the use of language like "equal protection of the laws," "due process 
of law," and "cruel and unusual punishment'' reflects a desire to enact constitutional principles 
that reach beyond the specific applications of those principles contemplated by the framers. See 
generally Schauer, An Essay on Constitutional Language, 29 UCLA L. REV. 797, 814-821 
(1982). 
41. R. DWORKIN, supra note :39, at 136. 
42. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 137 (1\l. Farrand ed. 
1966). 
43. The term is the Attorney General's. See Speech Before Federalist Society, supra note 
3, at :36. 
1987] CO:M!tlENTARY ON LAW 623 
ever, leaves its mark. It necessarily affects the way we regard de-
cisionmaking according to the "intentions" of the framers. Next I will 
attempt to explain why. 
Most of the debate over original intent focuses on the appropriate 
contours of clauses such as "due process of law," "equal protection of 
the law," "freedom of speech," "cruel and unusual punishment" and 
the like. 44 The text of the Constitution offers no explicit45 direction on 
the way in which these open-ended provisions should be interpreted. 
The methodology, strict or loose, literal or figurative, must be brought 
from the outside. The originalist concludes, usually based on an argu-
ment from democracy, that the open-ended phrases of the charter 
should invalidate only those government practices, or their direct mod-
ern analogues, 46 that the framers expressed a desire to proscribe. 
Originalist jurisprudence thus employs a substantial interpretive pre-
sumption. As Judge Bork has explained, "Courts must accept any 
value choice the legislature makes unless it runs clearly contrary to 
a choice made in the framing of the Constitution. "47 This strategic 
decision, demanded neither by text, intention, 48 or the nature of the 
enterprise, is, as Justice Brennan has argued, a political one.49 
44. See generally R. BERGER, surra note 3, at 166-220. Professor Schauer has elegantly 
reminded us recently that such open-ended provisions take on exaggerated significance for law 
professors - leading too easily to the conclusion that the constitution is fundamentally incom-
prehensible. Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 399 (1985). 
45. If anything, the text of the Constitution cuts the opposite way than the intentionists 
claim. The closest thing to an interpretive mandate in the federal charter is the ninth amendment. 
At the very least, the amendment indicates that rights are not to be "denied or disparaged" 
because they are not explicitly listed in the Bill of Rights. The amendment was included in 
Madison's package to attempt to defeat the inference that government was empowered to 
abrogate all rights not clearly set forth in the text. The strong originalist, therefore, embraces 
the inference, in the name of legislative intention, which Madison went to such pains to deny. 
See Laycock, Taking Co-nstitutions Se'riausly: A Theory of Judicial Review (Book Review), 59 
TEX. L. REV. 343, 353 (1981); Nichol, Children of Distant Fathers: Sketching an Ethos of 
ConstitutU:mal Libe'rly, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1305, 1311-16. 
46. It is thought acceptable, for example, to apply fourth amendment principles to electronic 
eavesdropping. 
47. Bork, surra note 3, at 1. 
48. See ge1zemlly Powell, supra note 34. 
49. W. Brennan, Speech to Text and Teaching Symposium, Georgetown University (Oct. 
12, 1985), ;·eprinted in THE GREAT DEBATE, surra note 3, at 15. Justice Brennan stated: 
A position that upholds constitutional claims only if they were within the specific 
contemplation of the Framers in effect establishes a presumption . . . against the 
claim of constitutional right .... Nothing intrinsic in the nature of interpretation 
• . . commands such a passive approach to ambiguity. This is a choice no less 
political than any other; it ell.-presses antipathy to claims of the minority rights 
against the majority. 
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Of course the political choice within the originalist claim is not 
without rationale. A reluctance toward the recognition of minority 
rights and a passive approach to ambiguity50 are thought necessary 
to avoid "being subjected to the whims of willful judges trying to 
make the Constitution live. "51 The phrases of the text could bear more 
expansive readings than demonstrable intention can support. But in 
order to escape the dangers of judicial usurpation, our constitutional 
visions of liberty and equality should remain anchored in those of the 
framers. 
Professor Law's essay demonstrates that this position is most palat-
able in the abstract. It is easy to suggest generally that judges have 
been authorized52 to invalidate only the sorts of evils the framers had 
on their minds. The originalist argues simply that the constitutional 
provision in question was not designed to prohibit the governmental 
activity challenged. Discrimination against women or illegitimates or 
homosexuals may indeed be unfortunate. But those practices do not 
implicate the fourteenth amendment's notion of equality because they 
were not the problems the framers sought to cure. 
When made concrete, however, the political choice of the inten-
tionalist faces a heavier burden. The intentionalist's argument suggests 
that our constitutional standards of liberty and equality must remain 
rooted in a world view, at least for purposes of judicial interpretation, 
that denies the very personhood of a substantial segment of our polit-
ical community. The originalist's policy choice, thus placed approp-
riately in its context, becomes a comparative one. Once we recall that 
neither the language and structure of the text nor the designs of its 
framers demands a grounding in specific intention to sustain a claim 
of constitutional right, the conjured fear of judicial usurpation must 
indeed be strong to force us to tie ourselves to 1791 or 1868. The 
intentionalist's desire to focus interpretation strictly on the founders' 
world can only be defended as strategic. Professor Law's essay effec-
tively demonstrates that the originalist strategy cannot always be 
characterized as a worthy one. 
Recall the world she describes. The colonial wife became civilly 
"dead" through marriage, subject to physical, sexual, financial, polit-
50. The phrases employed in the constitutional text - freedom of speech, equal protection 
of the laws, and the like - often served, of course, by their very ambiguity, to mask disagree-
ments among the framers. 
51. See Tushnet, supra note 25, at 787. 
52. Of course, permission cannot be used in any strong sense here because it begs the 
central issue of the dispute. It is not clear, based on text or intention, that, for example, the 
fourteenth amendment constitutionalizes only an 1868 vision of equality or due process. 
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ical, and even moral domination by her husband. 53 She was a cog, an 
essential one to be sure, but still only a cog in his patriarchal unit, 
to be employed as he saw fit. Like the slave and the child, she posses-
sed few rights that her superior partner was obliged to recognize. 
Each man needed a family to be complete. Still, it was only the adult 
white male in such an arrangement whom the law actually considered 
to be an individual. 
The most heartening aspect of American history has been its 
steady, though painful and grudging, movement away from the elitism 
of the founding generation. Although not yet accomplished, 54 its prog-
ress has been sufficient to render the world Law describes essentially 
unknown to us. I believe contemporary constitutionalists can barely 
imagine, let alone resurrect, the degree of subjugation colonial women 
experienced. Nor, as Professor Law suggests, can the framers' vision 
of se},'Ual equality be squared even with the text of the Constitution 
any longer. A conception of the role of women that denies their very 
personhood cannot survive the nineteenth amendment as a component 
of our constitutive order. The claim that the boundaries of appropriate 
interpretation of the constitutional mandates of liberty and equality 
must be rooted in the ideologies and practices of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, therefore, fails. 
Professor Law's essay, to my untrained eye, is good history. Yet 
I doubt stlict intentionalists will welcome it. The originalist jurispru-
dence assumes we can mentally resurrect a composite framer to in-
struct constitutional decisionmaking. When presented with a claim to 
abortion 1ights or gender equality, our representative founder would 
respond, in a felicitous tone, that "those were not the problems that 
we sought to address." End of case. 
But Professor Law forces the conversation further. The hypothet-
ical framer must explain not only that the challenged government 
practice is beyond the reach of the relevant constitutional prohibition, 
but why it is so. ''Women," he would continue, "could never be thought 
the equal of men. They are incapable of sophisticated thought or con-
versation. Politics is beyond their competence. And the management 
of property is best left to less frivolous minds. They are destined for 
the benign offices of wife and mother. Such is the unchanging law of 
God." 
53. See Law, mqrra note 2, at 590. 
54. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986) (homosell:ual relationships not 
constitutionally protected). 
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Perhaps this portrait overstates the case. But Law is correct that 
the framers' social assumptions about women and the family were "so 
profoundly sexist and so foreign to late twentieth century America"55 
that they cannot provide a basis for modern constitutional decisionmak-
ing. It is considerably more difficult to demand that we tie ourselves 
to the framers' visions of equality once Professor Law has forced us 
to wallow in them for a time. 
That does not mean that the framers' designs of the Constitution 
have no role in modern interpretation. The first step in giving content 
to the open-ended phrases of our fundamental charter is to explore 
what the draftsmen meant by those terms. On the one hand, this 
process is a familiar component in any hermeneutical enterprise. But 
even more fundamentally, it gives recognition to our own dependence. 
We did not make ourselves. As Alice Walker has written, "the grace 
with which we embrace life, in spite of the pain, is always a measm·e 
of what has gone before. "56 
But the ideas of our forefathers cannot provide a final solution to 
our constitutional dilemmas. Transporting ourselves back to the foun-
ders' world to legitimize judicial decisionmaking is often neither pos-
sible in fact, nor consistent with the constitutional design the framers 
chose to employ. Chief Justice Taney's opinion for the Court in Dted 
Scott v. Sandford,57 it should be remembered, was announced as an 
attempt "to interpret the instrument they have framed ... according 
to its true intent and meaning when it was adopted. "58 By purporting 
to explore "the minds of the framers of the Constitution when they 
were conferring special rights and privileges upon the citizens" of the 
Union, the Court arrived at its conclusion that neither "the class of 
persons who had been imported as slaves, nor their descendants, 
whether they had become free or not, were then acknowledged as a 
part of the people, nor intended to be included in the general words 
used in that memorable instrument. "59 The legacy of our forefathers, 
in many particulars, is a source of inspiration and pride for American 
public life. It is also, on occasion, something to be overcome. 
55. See Law, supra note 2, at 593. 
56. A. WALKER, REVOLUTIONARY PETUNIAS AND OTHER POEMS 1 (1971). 
57. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 405 (1856). 
58. Id. at 411-12. 
59. Id. at 407. 
